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A country's export demand function relates its export volume to the
relative  price of its  products  and to the  incomes  of international  buyers.  Price
and  income elasticities of  demand estimated  from such functions  are  used both for
predicting exports and prescribing effective export strategies.
The focus on  price and income elasticities has, however, led to the
neglect of an important  empirical regularity: a strong  persistence in the  growth
rate of a country's exports.  Persistence can arise from a slow adjustment to
short-term demand fluctuations, lasting typically for several quarters.  Such
inertia is of limited interest to us.  In this paper, we are concerned with a
persistence of much longer duration, implying the influence of institutional
features that exert long-lasting effects on export growth.
Evidence on persistence can be seen in different versions of  export
demand functions.  When the variables are expressed in levels, export demand
functions  tend to systematically  over-  or under-estimate export levels: in  other
words, the "residuals" (actual  minus estimated exports) have a high degree of
positive serial correlation, reflected in Durbin-Watson statistics of the order
of 0.75 (see,  for example, Krugman and Baldwin 1987, Landesmann and Snell 1989,
and  Bhalla 1989).  This same  characteristic  of export  growth is  seen  more sharply
when the variables of the demand function are represented as rates of growth: in
addition to growth explained by price and world  income changes, a non-zero,
country-specific growth rate (fixed  effect) is observed.
More often,  persistence in  export  growth rates  is  obscured due to  the
use of ad hoc procedures when estimating export demand functions.  First, long-
term persistence  is misread as a short-term adjustment to excess supply and
demand conditions and is accounted for (incorrectly, in our judgement) by the
inclusion  of  lagged  export  volume  as  an  "explanatory"  variable  (for  a  recent2
example,  see  Marquez  and  McNeilly  1988).
Second,  persistent  evolution  of export  volumes  is subsumed  in high
income  elasticities  of  demand. For  some  industrial  countries  (notably  Japan)  and
many  developing  countries,  income  elasticities  are  in the  range  of 2.5 to 5.0,
i.e.,  a one  percent  increase  in  world  income  increases  their  exports  by 2.5 to
5 percent (see  Marquez  and McNeilly  1988 for a review  of selected  studies).
Recently,  Muscatelli,  Sr  ivasan,  and  Vines (1992)  estimated  Hong  Kong's  income
elasticity  of demand  to  be 4.2.  Most  authors  are  generally  uncomfortable  when
reporting  such  high  elasticities.  Muscatelli,  Srinivasan  and  Vines (1992),  for
example,  note  that  the  high  elasticities  are  due  to: "a  failure  of conventional
models  of export  flows  (including  our  own)  to  identify  important  forces  causing
shifts  in export  demand: 'income  effects'  thus  probably  subsume  a variety  of
other  non-price  factors."  We will  show  that  while  their  instinct  on shifts  in
demand  are  right,  their  interpretation  of high  income  elasticities  is  probably
faulty.
Finally,  Helkie  and  Hooper  (1988)  provide  a  more  explicit  accounting
of persistence,  using  the  stock  of capital  in the  exporting  country  as a proxy
for  secular  changes  in  the  capability  to  supply  an  increasing  range  of  products.
Their  defense  for  "this  unabashedly  ad  hoc  adjustment  is  that  the  existing  price
indexes  do not  adequately  capture  the  price  effects  of the  introduction  of new
product  lines." Similarly,  Krugman  and  Baldwin  (1987)  add  a  time  trend  variable
to their  export  demand  equation  to account  for  long-term  changes.
Our  purpose  is  to  cast  a  spotlight  on  the  long-term  persistence  found
in the  data,  examine  its  robustness,  seek  statistical  proxies  that  may  account
for  the  persistence,  and  provide  an interpretation  of  the  observed  patterns. In
pursuing  this  investigation,  we  believe  that  we  have  identified  a  much  richer  set3
of export determinants than are implied in the traditional models t1at focus on
income and price elasticities and short-run adjustment.
Our first effort is to identify and examine sources of errors and
biases that may lead to exaggerated estimates of the persistence effect.  A
specific concern  is the  existence of  errors in  the  measurement of relative  price.
Aw  (1992) and Feenstra  (1992) have taken the approach  that such errors are
minimized when the demand equation is estimated for narrowly defined products
rather than for manufactured goods as a whole.  Although measurement errors
obviously  exist, and the choice  of instruments  used to  account for the errors  has
an  influence on  estimated price  elasticities, these considerations  are not
sufficient to explain away the long-term country-specific persistence.!
We suggest that the observed persistenci reflects a diffusion of
demand  from  industrial'zed to newly  industrializing economies  and  zould be
considered an  evolution  by  developing country exporters  from  "outsider" to
"insider" status.  An outsider is a marginal supplier; an insider is a supplier
with whom the buyer has a long-term relationship in  which both parties have made
(tangible  and  intangible) investments. Insiders  are  part  of an extensive  network
of  buyer-supplier relationships and draw on  this capital to maintain high growth
rates.
We provide ind4rect evidence of an "insider-outsider" phenomenon in
world markets  for manufactured goods by  examining asymmetries  in the income
elasticity of demand for different groups of countries.  Specifically, we find
that the magnitude  of the export  response depends upon whether  the buyers'
incomes  rise  or  fall.  When  world  income rises,  exports  rise  relatively
Y/  Benhabib and Jovanovic (1991)  also observe  persistence over 15 to 25  years
in the growth rates of per capita incomes in a wide range of countries.4
uniformly  for  different  country  groups;  the  decline  in  exports  with  world  income
contraction  is larger  and especially  sharp  for certain  countries.  Suppliers
facing  high  elasticities  on the  down-side  are  marginal  to the  buyer. When the
distinction  between  the  rise  and  fall  of  world  income  is  not  made,  high (average)
elas:,icities  are often  incorrectly  interpreted  as a sign  of successful  export
performance.
Countries  that  have  profited  from  the shift  to insider  status  have
not  been  passive  beneficiaries.  Racher,  they  have invested  in improving  their
transactions  infrastructure,  making them easier to do business with.  The
development  of a country's  telecommunications  network  appears  to be a partial
proxy  for  the  ability  to  deliver  time-  and  communication-sensitive  services  that
are relevant  for  developing  country  exports  of such  goods  as garments,  shoes,
bicycles,  consumer  electronics,  and  auto  parts.
The  paper  is organized  as follows. In section  II,  we describe  how
the  degree  of persistence  has  varied  across (and  within)  countries  over  time.
We  also  discuss  and  evaluate  issues  relating  to  mismeasurement  and  the  choice  of
proper instruments.  In Section III, we examine asymmetries  in the income
elasticity  of demand. The  use  of telecommunications  as  a proxy  for  the  quality
of a country's  transactional  infrastructure  is described  in Section  IV.  In
Section  V, we present  a  model  of  demand  diffusion  and  long-term  contracts  that
is  consistent  with  the  observed  evidence.  The  conclusion  evaluates  the  evidence
and  comments  on its  policy  relevance.II.  Patterns of Persistence
We begin with the following demand equation:
(1)  A.ogE,d  =  X +  A1og(PidP,)  al Alog(PX.1 /Pl'.A)  *  PAlogy,,
Equation 1 is designed to estimate a set of parameters from pooled observations,
for a number of countries and several years.  Each variable is defined for a
country i and a time t.  Ed is the demand for a country's exports, px is the
price of  the country's  exports,  pw is  the price  of  exports by  competitors
(proxied by a world price index) and yw is the world income relevant to the
country (the  weighted sum of the  purchasing countries' GDP, where the weight is
the average share of each  purchasing country in the total exports of the country
in question for the sample period).V  The coefficients a and S are the price
and income elasticities of demand, respectively.y  The symbol A  indicates that
the equation is specified in first differences (which  approximates to the rate
of growth when variables are expressed in their logarithmic value).
I/  We choose to use the average export share for the sample period, rather
than the export share for the corresponding year to avoid the possibility of
introducing endogeneity into our world income variable.
v  Riedel  (1988a) has argued that the results are substantially different
when, in contrast to the procedure adopted here, price is  used as the dependent
variable and export volume is the independent  variable.  Muscatelli, Srinivasan,
and Vines  (1992) show, however, that the normalization  (or the choice of the
dependent variable) does not matter once serial correlation and endogeneity are
accounted  for.  Riedel's results, therefore, appear  to arise  from the non-
stationarity of  the variables, leading to a  "spuriously" strong correlation
between the country's export  price and the  world price and eliminating all other
partial correlations.6
Of specific interest is y;,  which in our pooled cross-section time-
series setting summarizes, for each country i, the effect of country features
that  we do  not observe.  These  unobserved country features  include variables that
are  difficult  to  observe,  such  as  the  strength  of  international  marketing
relationships  between  suppliers  and  their  international buyers,  or  can  in
principle be observed but can be measured only imperfectly, such as the quality
of a country's infrastructure.  These features are a potential cause of export
growth persistence, and hence we begin our description of the data by treating
y as our  measure of persistence.  As constructed,  y 1 remains  unchanged over time;
however, by considering overlapping slices of time, we are also able to follow
the evolution of yi.
The questions of interest are: first, are the yi's  different from
zero, i.e., is there persistence in export growth rates; and, second, are the
yj's  different from  each other, or do the influences causing persistence vary by
country?
If  the yi 1s are different from zero and from each other, then the
unobserved differences across countries apparently have a significant influence
on export growth.  Benhabib and Jovanovic  (1991)  note that persistence in per
capita  income  growth rates  across  countries  could  either  reflect country-specific
features or all countries could be influenced  by the same stochastic forces but
the specific realization for  different countries could vary and cause long-term
differences.  They favor the latter interpretation for its parsimony.  While
empathizing with this  view, we  choose to focus  on  the specific country correlates7
of  persistence rat-her  than  attempting  to identify  the  common stochastic  structure
of knowledge and institutional evolution.
It is common in such estimations to allow for lags in the response
of exports to the variables influencing them.  We allow throughout for lags in
response to price changes.  Hence the previous year's  price  (with  the subscript
"t-1") is included as an explanatory variaile.  Landesmann and Snell (1989!  and
Krugman  and Baldwin  (1987) s"ow  empirically that  lags  in  the world  income
variable do not have much explanatory power.  Landesmann and Snell argue that
this is to be expected since changes in relative  prices require shifting to new
buyers and  hence imply  d  lag, whereas  changes in  world income do  not require such
shifts and hence lags are not likely.  Our estimations confirmed this result and
we do not report them here.
A.  TestinQ the Specification
The export demand function is estimated for a set of 20 developing
countries, from 1972 to 1985.  Results for 13 developed countries over the same
period are used wherever relevant.  The  data for  developing -;ountries  are pooled
when estimating the demand function.  The advantage in  pooling the data is that
we have sufficient degrees of freedom to estimate the coefficients with some
accuracy; the disadvantage is that  the price and income  elasticities are assumed
to be equal across the countries.  We show in the next section that the basic
finding  of persistent country-specific fixed  effects remains  unaltered even  when
price and income elasticities are allowed to vary across the countries in t}._8
sample.
To  allow  for  the  possibility  of  simultaneous  determination  of  export
volume  and  relative  prices,  we  use  the  two-stage  least  squares  procedure  (2SLS),
where  the  instruments  used  for  the  endcgenous  relative  price  variable  are:  lagged
exports  (AEt 1,t 2),  lagged relative  export  prices (A(PV/P"')  t.IJ2),  current  world
prices  (APWt),  current  and  lagged  wages  (A'Wt,l),  current  and  lagged  world  income
(AY.1 W,t_2),  and lagged  imports  of capital  goods (AN-I.t- 2)  --  all variables  are
expressed  in logs.
In the  first  equation  of table  1,  yi  are free  to take  on any  value,
allowing  for  the  possibility  that  yi  differ  by  country. This  is  our  most  general
model.  The  hypothesis  that the  yi  are equal  to zero  is rejected  very strongly
(the  p-value  for the X2-statistic  is 0.005).  The hypothesis  that all yl  are
equal,  though  not necessarily  zero,  is  also  rejected  with a  p-value  of 0.016.
Thus  the  evidence  on country-specific  fixed  effects  terms,  and  hence
on  the  persistence  of  growth  rates  in  specific  countries,  is  strong. Differences
in fixed  effects  between  countries  are  also  evident;  as  we shall  see  below,  two
groups  of countries  have very  different  fixed  effects  and  also face  different
buyer  behavior.
The  second  column  in  table  1  shows  that  the  20 developing  countries
as a group experienced  a statistically  significant  persistent  growth  of 4.4
f  In  the  presence  of  heteroskedasticity  the  least  squares  standard  errors  are
biased.  In our estimations  we use a consistent  estimator  of the covariance
matrix (White  1980).  We use the  Wald test for  the joint  significance  of the
coefficients,  the statistic  for  which  has  a Chi-square  distribution.9
percent a year, over and above that  explained by relative price and world incone
changes.  It is sobering to reflect that during this period the average rate of
growth of manufactured exports from these countries was 12 percent; thus about
one-third of export g.owth depended upon factors not conventionally accounted
for.  When the second and third columns i5  table 1 are compared, a--counting  for
persistent growth rates  substantially  lowers  the  income  elasticity  of demand from
4.1 to 3.1.
For individual countries,  such  as Turkey, Indonesia,  and Republic of
Korea, the proportion of growth explained by the persistent country-effect was
much larger than the average of one-third for all countries  (see column 4 in
table 2).  At the other extreme, a few countries that had negative underlying
persistent growth rates could have doubled their export growth if they had lost
their  handicap.  Another way to  assess  the  importance  of country-specific  effects
is to subtract them from the  actual  growth rate to arrive  at the  growth rate that
would have occurred if the underlying  persistent country-specific export growth
rate  had  been  zero  (column  3).  Though  the  actual  growth  rates  vary
substantially, the growth rates net of country-specific fixed effects are much
closer to each other.  In other words, if the countries with high fixed effects
terms did not have their unobserved  advantages, and the countries with low fixed
effects terms did not have their unobserved disadvantages, the export growth
rates of different countries would have been fairly closel  The implication is
that the degree  of relative price changes or the choice of specific export
destinations had a much smaller bearing on export performance than the factors10
that caused the persistent growth rates.
A  similar  experiment  with  the  developed  countries  yielded interesting
results.  The residual growth rates for these countries are relatively small,
generally  between  -2  and  3.6  percent,  and  these  could  not  be  considered
statistically different from zero.y  As expected, Japan has a positive residual
growth  rate, but it is small  (less than 3 percent).  Somewhat surprisingly,
Germany has a small negative residual growth rate.  As we discuss below, the
relatively  small  size of  the  residual growth  rate  for  developed  countries
suggests that the impact of non-price and non-income factors on the demand for
exports tends to diminish as the country secures its position as an insider in
international markets.
B.  Country Groups
One potential problem with our estimates of y 1 is that the price and
income elasticities have been constrained to  be equal across countries.  Hence,
if the countries  with rapidly  growing exports had larger elasticities, averaging
across  countries  would  result  in  high  positive  estimated  fixed  effect
coefficients; similarly, it would not be surprising if countries with negative
fixed effect coefficients are losing market shares as a result of below-average
income and price elasticities.
Ideally, the export demand function should be estimated  for each
The residual growth rates for developed countries are not reported in a
separate table, as they are not the main focus of the paper.11
country.  However, the limited degrees of freedom  make the estimates imprecise
as well  as unstable.  To overcome this limitation we  adopt two strategies.
First, we allow the price elasticities for specific  countries to  differ from the
average --  for example, we allow the price elasticity of Turkey and Indonesia,
which have the highest fixed effects estimates, to differ from that of other
countries in  Group I (by  creating  dummy variables  for each  of these countries and
interacting the dummy with the relative price).  The results show that income
and price elasticities for these countries are not statistically different from
the elasticities for other developirng  countries (with a p-value of 0.76), and
that large fixed effects remain.
The second strategy was to split the countries into two groups --
thopq  with  positive fixed  effects (Group  I)  and those  with zero or  negative fixed
effects  (Group II).  Using  the Chow  specification test,  we  tested  whether
splitting the countries in this fashion is supported by the data.  The data
strongly reject the restrictions imposed  by pooling all developing countries in
the sample, with an F-statistic of 6.88 and a p-value of 0.02 percent,  thus
supporting  the split.  Certain countries  on the  margin  were not easy to classify;
however, the exact composition of the two groups did not alter the results.  To
be  precise,  the  general  observations  from  the  regression  results  remain
unaltered; the interpretation  of the  performance  of  the specific countries  on the
margin, however, does change.
The following  differences between the  two  groups emerge.  First, the
average fixed  effect for Group I  is 9.4  percent and significantly different from12
zero with a t-value of 4.69, whereas the average fixed effect for Group II is
-1.0  percent and statistically insignificant  with a t-value of -0.38.  The price
elasticities for the two groups (the  sum of the current and lagged values) are
quite similar.  The point estimate of the income elasticity for Group II is
actually higher than that for Group I.  Though the difference between the income
elasticities  of  the two  groups is  not statistically  significant, the  larger  point
estimate for Group II is unexpected and we return to this issue below.
Table 3 shows that  country-specific fixed effects are significantly
different from each other in Group I, the p-value of the X2-statistic  is 0.006.
As  can  be expected, the  fixed  effects terms  obtained for individual  countries are
now different  from the ones obtained from pooling  all developing  countries.
However, the orders of magnitude and relative rankings are verv similar (compare
the first and the last columns in table 2).  The persistent growth rates of
Indonesia and Turkey are 19 and 17 percent, respectively, whereas Korea's is 12
percent.  When equation 1 is estimated for Group I countries, Portugal's fixed
effects term  becomes positive (in  contrast  to the result  when it is  estimated for
all developing countries, see Table 2).
Group  II countries have negligible country-specific fixed effects
when considered as a  group, though some have individually negative residual
growth  rates.  India,  for  example,  records  -3  percent.  Venezuela  has  a
relatively high 3.3 percent; however, the time pattern of the growth rate is
erratic, in part because its exports tend to be dominated by petroleum-related
products. Accordingly we keep it in Group II.13
Note also from  table 3 that the income  elasticity of demand is lower
for  the  products from  developed countries  than the  ones from  developing countries
--  this is commonly observed and attributed to the inclusion of high-growth
countries in the developing country sample.  However, Table 3 shows that the
difference  between  developed  and  developing  countries'  income  elasticities
originates in part from the high elasticity for the Group II countries (3.53),
which have low export growth rates and, typically, negative fixed effects.  The
paradox of high income elasticities  in  Group II  countries is  discussed in  Section
III,  leading  to  a  new  interpretation  of  conventionally  estimated  income
elasticities.
C.  Persistence
To study changes  in the  country-specific fixed effects  over time, we
create seven-year overlapping "windows"  in our sample period.  The first window
covers 1972-1978, the second: 1973-1979, the third: 1974-1980, and so on.  We
thus  have eight windows.  For  each  window we estimate  the export demand equation.
For  each country, therefore,  we obtain eight  yis.  (See  Figure 1,  where it should
be noted that year refers to the final year of the window.)
Despite  fluctuations,  most  countries  in  Group  II  (Argentina,
Colombia, Chile, India, Pakistan,  Yugoslavia, and Israel)  had low fixed effects
throughout the period  (Figure la)  ;  in contrast, most  countries in Group  I
(South Korea,  Singapore, Brazil, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Spain,  and
Greece) had relatively high fixed effects (Figure lb).14
However,  both increasing  and  decreasing trends  are also discernible,
indicating  that  the  groups  are  not  closed.  Indonesia,  Turkey,  Portugal,
Venezuela, and Mexico have steadily increased the size of their fixed effects
(Figure ic).  Significant  realignments occurred from 1981 to 1983, during a
severe downturn in global economic activity.  In these years, some of the East
Asian newly  industrializing economies  (such as Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan)
experienced rapid wage growth.  Countries that increased their fixed effects
coefficients during those years have continued to increase them.  A number of
countries suffered a sharp decline in fixed effects coefficients during that
period and have not recovered:  most of these  were countries that already had low
fixed effects  -- India, Israel, Argentina,  Chile, Colombia,  and Yugoslavia;
however, Greece and Philippines also suffered.
Further, in  the  early 1980s, estimated fixed  effects coefficients of
countries  that  performed  very  well  in  the  1970s,  including  South  Korea,
Singapore, Brazil, Malaysia and Thailand began to decline (Figure lb).  If the
high fixed effects term represents the transition from outsider status to the
ranks  of the insiders,  a decline in  the fixed  effect toward zero  represents their
maturity as insiders.
We draw three inferences from  these observations.  First, the  growth
of exports due to  unobserved factors  tends to  persist over  time within a country.
Second,  when  underlying  cost  conditions  change, and  for  instance,  Group  I
countries become expensive producers, new entrants are likely to gain.  Third,
these shifts take place over time but can be accentuated by downturns in the15
world economy.  During such periods international buyers seek new suppliers.
Firms and countries that are well-positioned in such years stand to make large
gains.
D.  Mismeasurement and Incorrect Instruments
Since the country-specific persistent influences could be merely a
reflection of errors in  measuring the relevant  price and income  variables, it is
necessary  to take  into account  the proposition  that  if all  variables  were
correctly measured, the observed persistence would disappear.  The implication
would be that price and/or income elasticities are much higher than typically
estimated.  A similar argument would hold if the simultaneous determination of
export prices and volumes was not fAlly accounted for.  The use of incorrect
instruments for relative price in the export demand function would lower the
(absolute)  value of the price elasticity of demand.
A common problem in estimating export demand functions is that the
price variable is  not measured correctly.  The unit values typically used, as is
the case here, do not account adequately for changes in the  composition of
exports.  Thus, for countries that shift toward products with higher prices per
unit  of  product  sold  (from t-shirts  to televisions), the  unit  value  index
understates the price increase (See  Alterman 1991, who finds that this has been
the case for U.S. imports from some developing countries).
Other factors will lead to an overstatement of the price change by
the unit value  index.  If new products  include an increasing fraction of  a16
country's exports, the true price index for the  enlarged bundle of goods will be
lower than the conventionally measured index (see  Feenstra 1992).  The effect
of the increased bundle of goods is identical  to  unmeasured quality improvements
or greater "taste" for that country's goods in world markets.  Feenstra  (1992)
has attempted to construct price indices that reflect the introduction of new
products  and the  exit  of old products  in the  goods  supplied by  developing
countries.  As noted, Helkie and Hooper  (1988)  use a more direct  (though  more
approximate) approach by including  in their demand function the capital stock of
the supplying country as a proxy for the ability to supply new products.
In our estimates, the measurement problem is alleviated by the use
of  instrumental  variables  and  by  data  transformation.  In  correcting  for
simultaneity, we use wage rates and other proxies for production conditions as
instruments.  In general, the solution for simultaneity is the same as that for
measurement error, and we have, in  principle, corrected for simultaneity.  The
question is  whether our  correction is  adequate.  Specifically, have  we adequately
accounted for influences  on the  supply  of  exports?  If  not, the  persistence being
picked up in the demand function could well be the result of ignoring supply
factors rather than a feature of the demand function.
We do not believe that it will be possible to fully resolve the
question  of whether  the observed persistence  derives  from supply  or  demand
factors.  However,  additional results suggest that while we  have not  fully
accounted  for all  supply influences, efforts at  refining the  export supply17
equation  are  not likely  to have  much  power in  eliminating  the  persistence effects
observed.
To test the sensitivity  of our results to the  choice of instruments,
we  experimented with dropping instruments  individually  or in  groups.  The  overall
conclusion is that neither the elasticities nor the fixed effects coefficients
change significantly.  Only when the world price was dropped from the list of
instruments, the estimated price elasticity of the Group I countries increased,
with no significant effect on the country-specific constant terms.
These results are similar  to those obtained by Feenstra (1992).  In
a more sophisticated correction of price changes, he finds that the quality-
adjusted price for  many developing countries rose more slowly than conventional
estimates  suggest.  The  correction leads,  in  his  case,  to  a  higher  price
elasticity of demand and a lower income elasticity,  although the changes are
limited in magnitude.
A  second approach to dealing with measurement errors is through the
transformation of  data.  At least  since  Griliches and  Hausman (1986),  it  has been
known that specific transformations of panel data can be used to minimize the
influence of measurement errors; it is also the case, however, that certain
transformations of the data can exacerbate measurement errors.  We measure the
variables as rates of change (first  differences of log values), a procedure that
is  generally considered to increase  the "noise-to-signal"  ratio, if  the variable
under consideration is serially correlated.  However, Griliches and Hausman  (p.
100) note that if the measurement error, rather than the variable itself, is18
serially correlated, then first-differencing helps to reduce the noise and to
increase the signal.  In our situation,  we can expect the measurement errors to
be highly positively  correlated, since quality and compositional  changes in
exports are  not random effects that  vary from  year to  year, but represent changes
over time.  This is at least partially borne out by the figures in Alterman
(1991),  in which unit value indices are compared with "true"  price indices: the
errors show significant  positive serial  correlation.  Thus first-differencing is
likely to be an effective method of reducing measurement errors.
Griliches and  Hausman (1986)  propose a test to  determine whether the
presence of measurement errors is a source of bias in parameter estimates.  The
test involves a statistical comparison of the GLS (random  effects) and the fixed
effects  (within)  estimators.
Adapting their framework and allowing for the possibility that the
unit values reflect export  prices only  partially, we write the percentage change
in the  export unit value  (AIh) as the  sum of  the percentage  change  in the
unobserved  export  price  (,Pit)  and the measurement error (v 1t):  AIt  =  AP,t+vk.  When
the  export  demand  equation  (equation  1)  is  estimated  with  AI;,  and  AI;  t-.  rather
than  the  true  price  variables,  the  residual  term  will  incorporate  a vt  + a1vi.,
which  will  be  correlated  with  AIft  and  AIj,t-l.  If  the  measurement  errors  are
negligible  and  there  are  no  other  sources  of  correlation  between  the  residuals
and the unit values, both models  (GLS  and fixed effects) will be unbiased and
consistent;  more importantly the parameter estimates from the two models  (GLS
and fixed effects) will be asymptotically equal.  However, when the correlation19
between  the  composite  residual term  and  the observed  export  unit  value  is
statistically significant, both models will produce biased parameter estimates
and these estimates will not be close to  each other.  As a result, it is  possible
to test for the statistical significance of measurement errors indirectly via a
test for the equivalence of the GLS and the fixed effect estimates using the
Hausman specification test (Griliches  and Hausman 1986).
P-values for the Hausman test (which  has a x2 distribution under the
null hypothesis) are reported in Table 3 for both the first difference and the
levels  estimation.  The test  results  show that  the first-differences  model is  not
plagued by the  use of unit'value indices.  In  contrast, however, we cannot reach
the same conclusion for the levels estimation.  Hausman tests for all country
groups  have  very  small  p-values,  which  implies  that  the  levels  estimation
produces biased estimates due to measurement errors;  the highest p-value is
obtained for the developed countries.  This result is consistent with the fact
that  the composition  of exports from  developed  countries is  more stablP over time
compared to exports from developing countries,  and that the quality of the data
from developed countries is higher.
III.  Asvmmetries in Income Elasticity: Insiders  and Outsiders
Traditionally, the effect of non-price factors is thought to be
captured by the response of exports to changes in  world income (summarized  in P,
the  income  elasticity  of  demand).  A  high  income  elasticity  of  demand  is20
considered  a measure  of superior  quality,  although  as noted,  the relationship
does  not  seem  obvious  from  table  3. The  income  elasticity  of  demand  for  products
from developing  countries  is much higher  than that from  developed  countries.
Should  that be read to imply  that  developing  countries  export  higher  quality
products? Within  developing  countries,  it is  much  higher  for  the  lagging  Group
II countries  than for  the  dynamic  Group  I countries.
Krugman  (1989)  suggests  that  the  observed  high  income  elasticity  of
demand  for  Japanese  products  reflects  that  country's  ability  to  rapidly  increase
the  variety  of  products  sold  on  world  markets.  Muscatelli,  Srinivasan,  and  Vines
(1992)  similarly suggest  that Korea,  Taiwan, and Hong Kong have benefitted
through  expanding the range of products  for sale.  However,  as noted, our
estimates  show that  the  slow-growing  (Group  II)  countries  have  a higher  income
elasticity  than the Group I countries,  which is contrary  to what would be
expected  if income  elasticity  were  a good  measure  either  of  product  quality  or
of expanding  product  variety.
The  paradox  is  resolved  when  we  consider  the  possibility  that  exports
respond  asymmetrically  to  changes  in  world  demand. We  test  the  proposition  that
income  elasticity  is  different  when  world  income  rises  than  when  it  falls  in  the
following  equationYV:
More  refined  non-linear  responses  could  be  tested  but  the  results  presented
are  striking  enough. The  years  in  which  world  income  fell  were:  1974,  1975,  and
1982.21
(2)  AlogLie  = yi  £0 Aog(Pt/P¢)  +  a 1Alog(e  ,w,/P'.)
+  V  (AlogY7eV  +  +  1*- [AlogY7eV
where:
AlogY'  if  AlogY  P0
(AlogYl =
O  otherwise.
AlogYr  if  AlogYl<O
(AlogY'V  ={(
O  otherwise.
The effects of world income change are sharply asymmetric  (table  4).  In years
of  rising  income,  the  elasticities  (P+) for  the  different  groups  of  countries
are  fairly  close  --  between  1.51 and 1.84.'  The  response  to  a  decline  in  world
income,  however,  is  much  higher  and  more  heterogenous.
The  difference  between  income  elasticities  when  incomes  rise  ana  fall
is  small  and  statistically  insignificant.  In  the  case  of  developed  countries,
the  p-value  for  the  x2 test is 0.22, substantial for Group I  countries  but  not
significant at the 5 percent significance level, and large and significant for
Group  II countries with a p-value of 0.023.  When  world income rise by  1
7/  For Group II countries, P+  are barely statistically different from zero at
the 10 percent level of significance;  however, it is  not statistically different
from the corresponding elasticity for Group I and developed countries at the S
percent level of significance.  The data continue to support the estimation of
demand equations separately for Group I and Group II countries, rather than for
all developing countries.  However, compared to  the original demand equation the
F-statistic is low  at 2.41  with a p-value of 0.049,  which implies that the  model
with  pooled  developing  countries  can  be  rejected  only  at  the  5  percent
significance level.22
percent, exports of Group II countries increase by almost 2 percent  (0+=1.84);
but when world income falls by 1 percent, exports from these countries decline
by 14 percent  (P-=14.0).  Thus, in times of rising incomes, all countries gain
equally in terms of export growth.  When world income declines, however, the
Group  II countries are hit the hardest; since they do not enjoy any special
advantage when the upturn occurs, they lose market share over time.
If product  characteristics were  the main  factor  in  determining
elasticity,  one would  expect  that when  incomes fall, expenditure  on  luxury
products would register the sharpest decline.  Thus we would conclude that 1-
should be the higheet for developed countries, instead of which, it is actually
the lowest.  Similarly, if the Group II countries are supplying basic products
that account for a low share of the incomes of consumers, their exports would
hardly be affected by a decline in world income.
The ordering of a-  can be better explained in terms  of the demand for
adherence to delivery standards and long-term buyer-supplier relationships, as
discussed in Section V.  when global demand declines, profit margins shrink and
buyers are more sensitive to product reliability and delivery schedules.  Thus
they rely to a much greater extent on suppliers with a strong track record than
they would in periods of strong demand and higher profit margins.
Moreover, buyers invest in long-term relationships.  The cost of
breaking a relationship is particularly high when ties are strong.  Buyers in
industrial countries, who generate about two-thirds of the world  demand  for
manufactured exports, have strong relationships  with other industrial countries23
(Hakansson  1987);  relationships  are  weakest  in  Group  II  countries,  and  are  easily
broken. The  marginal  supplier  is  the  first  to  lose  an order.  Such  asymmetric
effects,  which  reflect  the  different  costs  of breaking  relationships,  have  also
been noted in the context  of the insider-outsider  theory of labor markets
(Lindbeck  and  Snower  1988,  Chapter  9).
For countries  seeking  to enhance  their  presence  in international
markets,  therefore,  it is  particularly  critical  to  perform  well during  periods
of slowing  or declining  world  demand. Growth  in exports  when world  demand  is
growing  is relatively  easy and  does  not contribute  significantly  to increased
market  share. Maintaining  market  share  when  world  income  is growing  slowly  or
falling  is  of  much  greater  value  in  terms  of  increasing  long-term  buyer  interest.
These results also show that conventional  measures of income
elasticity  that  do  not  disentangle  the  asymmetry  discussed  can  lead  to  erroneous
interpretations.  Landesmann  and  Snell  (1989),  for  example,  find  that  the  income
elasticity  of demand  for  manufactured  exports  from  the  United  Kingdom  has  been
rising,  which they assume implies  greater  non-price  competitiveness. It is
curious,  however,  that  during  this  period  (late  1981  and  1982),  the  U.K.  Is  share
of  exports  in  world  trade  fell  quite  precipitously  and  declined  even  further  in
the  next five  years (Landesmann  and  Snell  1989,  figure  3).
Our  interpretation  is  that  U.K.  exports  have  performed  poorly  during
global  downturns. The  arithmetic  average  of a low  elasticity  when  world  income
expands  and  very  high  elasticity  when  income  falls  can  be quite  large. In  this
case  high income  elasticity  suggests  that  the  U.K.'s  non-price  competitiveness24
fell  during the last decade.  Our  measure of  non-price factors,  y;,  shows a clear
decline in the case of England.
In  terms  of  method,  therefore,  this paper  shows  that  commonly
estimated  measures of income elasticity  of  demand can be  very misleading.  If  the
asymmetric response of demand to  rises and declines in income is  not considered,
the  high estimated income  elasticity  will be incorrectly interpreted  as Implying
high product quality or an increasing  variety of products.
IV.  Telecommunications Penetration: A Proxy for Service Oualit ?
There are no simple physical correlates of a process by which new
buyers  are  drawn  to  a  supplier.  However,  we  attempt  to demonstrate  that
transactional quality  (as  proxied by the telecommunications infrastructure) is
important. We find  that  discontinuous  shifts in  transactional  quality are needed
to make the jump from outsider to insider.
The number of telephone  lines per capita is  used, as a proxy for the
ability  to  communicate  easily with buyers  and  to  respond  rapidly  to  their
requests.  Note that this measure is mainly an indicator of the quality of the
transactions environment and not necessarily of the quality of the goods being
sold.  To the extent that these  are different,  the measure is  only a  partial one.
Table 5  reports the  regressions  when the telecommunications variable
is  added to the  demand equation.  To  examine the  possibility of endogeneity, both
the contemporaneous growth of telecommunications  and growth in the  previous year
are considered.25
For Group I countries, we find the contemporaneous growth rate of
telecommunications penetration had  no effect on export growth but growth in the
previous year had a positive effect on the growth of manufactured exports.  The
elasticity of  export growth  with respect  to  growth in  telecommunications  is 0.54,
which is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent significance level.
More importantly,  when  telecommunications  availability is  introduced
as an independent explanatory variable, the fixed effects become much weaker.
As before, we use the X2-statistic  to test the significance of the persistence.
Recall that  when the telecommunications  variable is not included as  a right-hand
side variable, the X2-test strongly suggests the significance of the constant
term (or  the average persistent growth rate) as well as the significance of the
individual fixed effects coefficients.  When the telecommunications variable is
introduced directly into the demand  equation, however, the p-values for  both of
the X2-tests  rise to 0.08.  The significance levels, however, are sensitive to
the specification of the demand function.  Thus when we allow for asymmetric
income  elasticities, the  p-value of the X2-test  for the significance of country-
specific  fixed  effects  is  0.02.  Thus,  while  telecommunications growth  is
strongly related to export growth in  Group I countries, it  does not conclusively
account for the country-specific effects.
The result is useful, however, because it points us in a direction
that  provides  an  intuitively  acceptable  explanation  of  persistence.  Two
observations  are  relevant  in  this regard.  First,  regardless of  the  exact
specification,  with  the  inclusion of  telecommunications  as  an  explanatory26
variable, the  magnitude of the  fixed  effects  coefficients falls for  all countries
and  in  some--notably  Korea--the  fixed effects  term almost  disappears.  In
Indonesia and Turkey, the two most dynamic countries in the sample, the fixed
effects  decline but remain large.  Second,  table 6 shows  that countries with high
export  persistence  have  high  average  growth  rates  of  telecommunications networks.
For Group II countries (with  low  and negative) fixed effects, table
5 shows that the  contemporary telecommunications penetration  has a positive
effect on export growth and the coefficient is significant at the 10 percent
level.  A contemporaneous link could well be the result of more rapid exports
resulting in greater telecommunications investment.  If that is the case, the
contemporaneous coefficient  will  be biased  upward.  To  test for  that possibility,
we also examine the relationship between the lagged  value of telecommunications
penetration and export growth.  Lagged telecommunications  growth appears to have
no effect on export growth in this set of countries; the coefficient is negative
and insignificant with a t-statistic  of -0.35.  The evidence is, therefore, very
suggestive of the possibility that indeed the causality runs from export growth
to telecommunications investment.
To summarize,  while the  direction  of  causality in  either case  remains
uncertain, Group I countries have had high export and telecommunications growth
rates, whereas Group II countries have experienced low  growth in both respects.
It is tempting to infer that a certain acceleration in growth, or a "push," in
either of the two variables is required to  move from the low-growth to the high-
growth cycle.  Although such a push could be successful in situations where the27
capability of exporters to respond consistently with internationally marketable
goods is high, it could also lead to waste.
Note that the approach  adopted in this  section is similar to that of
Helkie and Hooper (1988)  who take the stock of capital in the economy as a proxy
for  the supply  of a larger  variety  of goods.  We focus  on just telecommunications
because it is likely to be more germane to export activity.  Moreover, for the
same reason, we prefer to think of telecommunications variable  in the demand
equation as a measure of  transactional quality rather than  as a measure  of
ability to supply an increased variety of goods.
V.  A Descrintive Model of Diffusion and Lona-Term Contracts
If persistent growth rates are not artifacts, what omitted export-
inducing explanatory variables do they reflect?  Why are the influences of the
omitted variables not captured in high (or  low) income elasticities of demand?
And why do they instead appear as unidentified country-specific residuals?
The country fixed effects term reflects the influence of non-price
factors that are not captured by world income.  As distinct  from short-term
changes in demand because of world income changes, the fixed effects term is a
measure of the  secular increase in  a  country's  market share. Thus, the  existence
of a  positive country-specific fixed effect  represents a diffusion of demand for
t.e country's  products,  that occurs when  new buyers  are  attracted  or  when
existing buyers shift demand from other suppliers.
Product-cycle theories (Vernon  1966 and Krugman 1979)  would predict28
that the demand for specific croods  shifts from developed country suppliers to
developing country suppliers  who operate  with lower wage  costs; in  our  estimates,
however, a shift in the market share of all manufactured exports is implicit.
The  shift,  therefore,  represents more  than  a  simple product-cycle  effect;
countries that benefit  from this shift in demand are being transformed from
"outsiders" to  "insiders" in the world trading system: thus, they sell to a
greater number of buyers and they sell a larger variety of goods.
Buyers "sample"  products from different firms  in  different countries
and  make  inferences  about  quality  and  delivery  standards.  In  purchasing
manufactured  goods  (especially time-  and  fashion-sensitive  items,  such  as
clothes, shoes, bicycles, televisions) the dimensions of quality sought by a
buyer  are:  adherence  to  specifications,  rimely  delivery,  and  ease  of
communications;  good communications  are  essential for  quick  changes  in  production
and delivery (see Boatman 1991 and Pashigian 1988).
A few samples of poor quality can break the links between buyer and
supplier (even  a single bad sample will do this, if the prior reputation is very
unfavorable).  Good samples increase confidence in the supplier.  The buyer, of
course, is anxious to choose a source  as costs are incurred during the sampling
process.  At some point, the  buyer will select from those  he perceives to be  good
suppliers.  Mistakes are possible, however, because sampling is not a perfect
predictor.
Once the decision is  made, buying offices  will be established, local
agents will be recruited, and relationships with suppliers will be formed.  At29
this  stage,  the  buyer  has  an  incentive  to  improve  the  performance  of  his  supplier
and is likely  to provide  information  and support  to reinforce  the suppliers,
strong  points. Not  only  is  there  a  significant  cost  to  making  these  commitments,
but it is also  costly  to abandon  them.  If the  long-term  relationships  are  not
used,  their  value  depreciates  rapidly  and  must  be rebuilt. This  process  creates
the  persistence  in relationships  that  we have  observed  in  our field  work (Egan
and  Mody 1992),  and  is consistent  with  the relative  stability  of the country-
specific  fixed  effects.F
This  line  of reasoning  is  closely  related  to the  Roberts  and  Tybout
(1992)  analysis  of sunk  costs  in  exporting. Those  firms  that  have exported  are
treated  as having  incurred  the  sunk  costs,  raising  the  probability  of exporting
in  the  current  period  and  in  the  future. Our  findings  suggest  that  in  addition
to  exporters  incurring  sunk  costs,  buyers  (conditional  on  transactional  quality)
also  make  sunk  investments  in  the  establishment  of long-term  relationships  with
their suppliers.  Both buyers  and sellers,  therefore,  have an incentive  to
maintain  their  relationship,  contributing  to  persistence  in export  growth.
Persistence  in  trade  flows  has  also  been  examined  in  the  context  of
Y  In the statistical  literature,  the process of sampling  described is
referred  to as the two- (or  multi-)  armed  bandit  problem.  The analogy
refers to slot machines  which have more than one arm, each with a
different  pay off.  It is optimal  in this situation  to sample  from both
arms for  a limited  period  and then invest  all resources  on the one that
seems  to have  a better  performance  (see  Degroot  1970). Cowan (1988)  has
extended  the  multi-arm  bandit  problem  to the  situation  we consider  here:
once a choice  is made,  further  investment  in the  relationship  reinforces
the  decision  to stick  to one's  choice.30
U.S. trade  by Krugman and Baldwin (1987),  and their interpretation is similar to
ours.  They argue that export prices react only with long lags to changes in
exchange rates  and that  trade volumes react  only  with long lags to export  prices.
They use the "Book  of the  Month Club" analogy to explain these lags: once buyers
subscribe to a particular club, relative price changes do not  cause them to
abandon the club unless these price changes persist.
A  similar  pattern  of  persistence  is  found  in  labor  markets.
"Insiders" in the labor market are experienced workers who are hard to fire
because they  are more  productive, have legal  contracts  that are expensive to  buy,
and work as a  team.  "Outsiders"  are costly to identify  and train.  A consequence
of insider power is that  wage and employment levels tend to  persist.  The degree
of persistence is not unlimited and if wage differentials between insiders and
outsiders become too large, a reshuffling can occur  (see Lindbeck and Snower
1988).
VI.  Conclusions
Growth rates  of manufactured exports from developing countries tend
to be persistent,.although not immutable.  In addition to the price and income
elasticities, a country's exports are  partially influenced  by the quality of its
transactional infrastructure (proxied  by telecommunications penetration).  More
importantly,  we find indirecr  evidence  of "insiders"  and "outsiders" in  the  world
market for manufactured goods, a condition that tends to perpetuate itself.
An asymmetry in the income elasticity of demand is related to the31
persistence  of export  growth. The  magnitude  of  the  decline  in  exports  following
a fall  in  world  income  is  greater  than  the  rise  following  an increase  in  world
income. The  degree  of  asymmetry  is  greatest  for  marginal  exporters  (outsiders),
who  are hardest  hit  from a drop in world  income;  these  are also the countries
that face  persistently  low or negative  growth  rates.  In contrast,  developing
countries  with  persistently  high  underlying  growth  rates  suffer  a  milder  setback
when  world  income  drops. Thus,  countries  with  high  persistent  growth  rates  are
beneficiaries  of  a  secular  shift  in  demand,  which  reflects  their  changing  status
from  marginal  to long-term  suppliers.
This descriptive  account is consistent  with the hypothesis  that
international  buyers  invest  in  long-term  relationships  to  ensure  product  quality
and reliable  delivery,  and use  these  relationships  to transfer  production  and
marketing  knowledge  to  their  suppliers.  The  resulting  network  of relationships
creates  social  capital  that  makes  it  costly  to  change  buying  patterns. Hence  the
stability  in buying  relationships  is broken  mainly  when  production  conditions
change  significantly.  The limited  number  of countries  that  are able  to change
their  status  from  outsiders  to  insiders  experience  explosive  growth.  Once  their
insider  status  is  established  growth  tends  to  level  off. The  evidence  also  shows
that countries  that appear  to have acquired  such social  capital  have further
benefitted  from  physical  investment  in  their  transactional  infrastructure.
Many  theoretical  models  and  export  development  strategies  assume  that
developing  and  newly  industrializing  economies,  which  are small  in relation  to
the  world  economy,  can  rapidly  expand  exports  if  domestic  supply  constraints  are32
removed.  The results here do not support the notion that demand for developing
country exports is infinitely price elastic;  neither do they imply elasticity
"pessimism." A price elasticity of  about 1 is  observed, large enough that  policy
efforts to change relative prices should have a significant effect on export
growth.  From a methodological point of view,  the paper  supports Feenstra's
conclusion that  efforts at refining  measures of relative  price lead to only small
changes in the elasticities.
The  paper's  main point  is  that price-related  measures,  such  as
devaluation or export subsidies, will have limited effects unless backed up by
infrastructure that makes the  country an efficient and reliable supplier.  These
attributes are of great importance for international buyers.  The argument for
the overwhelming role of price as a determinant of export competitiveness is
certainly open to question.  Riedel (1988b)  points to Turkey as an example  of the
benefits of trade liberalization and export subsidies, but it is worth noting
that  Turkey's exports have  also been  supported  by a massive effort to improve the
predictability of suppliers  and expand  the  country's telecommunications network.
This is  not to infer  that  a sophisticated telecommunications network
is the simple answer to export development.  Telecommunications penetration is
not a fully  satisfactory proxy for  service  quality.  Moreover, in the  case of the
slower-growing, Group II countries, the evidence suggests that exports induce
telecommunications investment rather  than the  other way around.  The implication
for these countries is that mere reliance  on telecommunications expansion as an
instrument  for  expanding exports is  likely  to  result in  disappointment.  Building33
long-term export relationships  with international  buyers also require the
capacity  to deliver  reliable  products  on time.
The  findings  imply  that  effective  microeconomic  institutional  reforms
that  improve  the  ease  with  which  transactions  are  accomplished,  together  with  an
enhanced  ability  to meet  the  exacting  demands  of world  markets  are  critical  to
export  success.  Such  reforms  cannot  be  achieved  at  once,  and  self-correction  may
be required  to improve  performance.34
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APP8NDIX:  Definition  of  Variables  and  Data  Sources
P'  :  Unit value index for manufactured exports,
World Tables  (WT),  1980100,  US dollar based.
pW:  Unit value index for worldwide exports of manufactured goods,
GATT: International Trade, 1987-1988, 1980=100.
W  :  Nominal wage rate, ( - RW *  GDP deflator ),
RW :  real earnings per employee in manufacturing, WT, 1980=100;
GDP deflator  :  WT, 1980=100, local prices.
e  :  Nominal exchange rate, index, WT, conversion factor(annual average).
B  :  Exports of manufactured goods, WT, constant 1980 US dollars.
Yw :  World GDP, defined as
94
r siyi
where  YJ is the GDP of the ith  partner of the country i, in constant
1980 US dollars, and  sJi  is the average share of partner j  in the total
exports of  i throughout the period:
and E'i  :  Manufactured goods exports from ith country to its jth
partner, constant 1980 US dollars.  Manufacturing sector covers all
products from SITC 5 to SITC 8 minus SITC 68. Source: United Nations,
Comtrade Database.
K  :  Capital good imports, constant 1980 US dollars.
Data from Comtrade database  ( =  71 +  72, SITC ) in current prices, US
dollars,  are deflated  by the  price index for  worldwide  capital  good imports
from UN Statistical Bulletin, 1970-87.
T  Telephone stations (sets)  of all kinds per 100 inhabitants.
Data series 9.1, from The Yearbook of Common Carrier Telecommunications
Statistics,  various issues.37
Table 1:  Export Demand Fur.ctions  for Developing Countries
Dependent Variable:  Rate of Growth of Export Volume  (&log E,)
Country-specific  Yi  =  zj  Fi - 0
7'Y
Alog  (P/PW)t  - 0.95  - 1.01  - 1.08
(-  3.62)  (-  3.46)  (-  3.66)
slog  (px/pw) 1 1 - 0.20  - 0.21  - 0.12
(-  1.42)  (-  1.58)  (-  0.87)
Alog  ywt  3.10  3.10  4.14
(6.81.)  (6.38)  (12.45)
Constant  (7)  20.044  _
(2.67)
No.  of observations  253  253  253
D-W statistic  2.06  1.85  1.79
R-bar  squared  0.22  0.18  0.16
p-value (X 21)  0.016  _
p-value  (X  2)  0.005
Notes:  1.  p-value  (X2i)  - marginal significance level for HO:  7y  =  yj.
2.  p-value (X22)  - marginal  significance  level  for  Hb:  yi  yj =0.
3.  t-statistics  in  parenthesis,  based  on standard  errors  robust
to  general  cross-section  and  time-series  heteroskedasticity
(White  1980).
4.  i  and  j refer  to countries.
5.  Instruments include:  AE 1.1t.2,  AYw,tl.2  APw  A (pX/Pw)t  - .2'
AW,  t-. 1,  A*Ktl,  t.2-  All  variables  are  expressed  in  logs.38
Table 2:  Quantitative Importance of Country Specific Fixed Effects
Country-specific  Actual  Growth  rate  Relative  importance  Country-specific
growth rate  growth  rate  without  country-  of country-specific  growth  rate
(pooled)  specific  effects  effect  (separate  groups)
(2)  (4) = (1)/(2)  (5)
(1)  ~~~~~~~~(3)  =(2)  - (1)
Brazil  6.6  16.5  9.9  0.40  9.2
Greece  2.1  10.4  8.3  0.20  4.2
Indonesia  16.9  26.3  9.4  0.64  19.2
South  Korea  8.9  17.0  8.1  0.52  10.9
Malaysia  10.4  15.4  5.0  0.68  11.8
PhDippines  14.3  18.7  4.4  0.76  16.1
Porugal  -0.6  7.3  7.9  -0.08  1.5
Singapore  6.2  12.6  6.4  0.49  7.8
Spain  1.4  9.9  8.5  0.15  3.7
Thailand  6.7  13.7  7.0  0.49  8.5
Turkey  16.2  21.7  5.5  0.75  17.6
Argenine  -0.5  2.8  3.3  -0.18  -1.7
Chile  -0.1  7.5  7.6  -0.02  -1.1
Colombia  -0.25  3.8  6.3  -0.67  -3.9
India  -2.3  3.7  6.0  -0.61  -3.6
Israel  3.3  11.7  8.4  0.28  2.6
Mexico  -3.2  3.1  6.3  -1.04  -4.5
Pakistan  1.3  8.7  7.4  0.15  0.2
Venmzuela  3.6  14.4  10.8  0.25  2.7
Yugoslavia  0.6  5.6  5.0  0.11  -0.7
Note:  Country-specific growth rates (column  1) are the  corresponding  fixed-
effect terms from the pooled estimation of equation 1 for 20 developing
countries in our sample.  Country-specific growth rates in Column 5 are the
fixed effects terms from separate estimations for Group I and II countries.39
Table 3:  Persistence Effects in Different Country Groups
Dependent  Variable:  Rate  of Growth  of Export  Volume  (Alog  Et)
Developing Countries  Developed
Group I  Group II  All  Countries
Alog  (px/pw)  - 0.57  - 0.93  _ 0.95  - 0.28
(- 1.83)  (- 2.76)  (-  3.62)  (-3.38)
Alog  (PK/PW) 1 1 - 0.29  - 0.11  - 0.20  - 0.16
(  2.32)  (- 0.5)  (- 1.42)  (1.79)
Alog Ywt  2.29  3.53  3.10  1.78
(3.91)  (4.52)  (6.81)  (8.67)
No. of observations  141  112  253  169
D-W statistic  2.02  2.14  2.06  2.15
R-bar squared  0.18  0.24  0.22  0.38
Hausman - difference  0.71  0.26  0.91  0.94
Hausman - levels  2x10- 5 0.0  0.001  0.022
p-value  (X21)  0.006  0.99  0.016  0.22
p-value  (X 22)  7x104 0.99  0.005  0.27
Notes:  1. p-value  (x  21)  *  marginal significance level for Hi: y  =  j
2. p-value  (X22)  =  marginal significance level for HO: yl  - Tj  =0.
3. t-statistics in parenthesis, based on standard errors robust
to general cross-section and time-series  heteroskedasticity
(White  1980).
4. i and j  refer to countries.
5. Instruments include: AE_t. 2, AYWt.ttlt2,  APwt, A  (P[/PW)  t-1.  t-2'
AWtt 1,  AKt1.  t-2*  All variables are expressed in logs.40
Table 4:  Asymmetries in Income Elasticity
Dependent Variable: Rate of Growth  of Export Volume  (&log Et)
Developing Countries  Developed
Group I  Group II  All  Countries
Alog  (px/pw)  t  0.71  - 0.88  - 1.02  - 0.28
(- 2.23)  (- 2.69)  (- 3.93)  (-  3.31)
Alog  (p/pw)  t-  - 0.29  - 0.10  - 0.20  - 0.14
(- 2.36)  (-  0.48)  (- 1.52)  (1.55)
[Alog yw 1]+  l.Sl  1.84  1.64  1.55
(2.05)  (1.78)  (2.65)  (5.14)
[Alog Ywtl-  8.69  14.00  3.2.68  3.65
(2.43)  (2.97)  (_.97)  (2.45)
No. of observations  141  112  253  169
D-W statistic  2.06  2.18  2.12  i.lO
R-bar  squared  0.18  0.27  0.24  0.38
p-value  (X
2 ;)  0.004  0.96  0.007  0.17
p-value  (X 22)  0.0001  0.90  0.0001  0.19
p-value  (X  3)  0.069  0.023  0.002  0.22
Notes:  1.  p-value  (X21)  =  marginal significance level for HO:  'yi =  yj.
2. p-value  (X22)  =  marginal significance level for HO:  yi  =  =0°
3.  p-value  (X23)  =  marginal  significance  level for go  :  B+ -.
4. t-statistics in parenthesis, based on standard errors robust
to  general  cross-section  and  time-series  heteroskedasticity
(White 1980).
5.  i  and  j  refer  to  countries.
6. Instruments include: AEt_.t2,  t  AYwtt  tA  ( 1/  PW)t_.  t.2,
AWt.  t-l  AKt-1.  t-2 -All  variables  are  expressed  in  logs.41
Table 5:  Telecommunications as a  Proxy  for Service Quality
Dependent Variable:  Rate of Growth of Export Volume  (Alog Et)
Group I  Group II
Alog  (PX/pw) 1t  0.67  - 0.70  0  0.90  - 0.87
(- 2.09)  (- 2.16)  (- 2.52)  (- 2.27)
Alog  (PVP/w)tI  - 0.30  - 0.35  - 0.15  - 0.10
(- 2.37)  (- 2.97)  (- 0.57)  C-  0.4)
Alog  YWt  2.32  2.43  3.51  3.27
(3.93)  (4.14)  (4.15)  (3.85)
Alog Tt  0.13  - 0.85  _
(0.52)  (1.63)
Alog  Tt.i  - 0.54  - 0.19
(2.13)  (- 0.35)
No. of observations  138  137  100  103
D-W statistic  2.05  2.00  1.97  2.07
R-bar squared  0.17  0.21  0.28  0.23
p-value  (% 21)  0.062  0.077  .99  .99
p-value  (X 27)  0.035  0.083  .86  .99
Notes:  1.  p-value  (X'I)  - marginal  significance  level  for  HO:  y  yj.
2.  p-value  (X22)  - marginal significance level for HO:  '=j  yj  =0.
3. t-statistics in parenthesis, based on standard errors robust
to general cross-section and time-series heteroskedasticity
(White  1980).
4.  i  and  j  refer  to  countries.
5.  Instruments  include:  AEt,.It2 AYw t-t.,t 2 APwt,  A(PX/PW)t-l.t-2
AWt,  t-  AI  S4, t-2;  and  ATt-I  or  ATt,  depending  on  the  equation
estimated.  All  variables  are  expressed  in  logs.42
Table 6:  Telecommunications Penetration Rates
Average  1971  1985  Average  Group
1971-85  growth rate
Korea  9.67  2.10  25.50  0.15  I
Singapore  24.65  6.80  44.24  0.11  I
Turkey  4.21  1.62  9.07  0.10  I
Malaysia  4.66  1.61  9.08  0.09
Yugoslavia  8.10  3.59  NA  0.07  n
Thalnd  0.96  0.43  NA  0.09  I
Brazil  5.28  2.09  9.30  0.09  1
Mexico  6.20  3.12  NA  0.08  U
Greece  26.96  11.97  41.34  0.07  1
Indonesia  0.33  0.17  0.52  0.07  I
Spain  27.52  13.46  39.59  0.06  I
Israel  30.02  17.40  46.89  0.06  n
India  0.37  0.22  0.57  0.06  U
Philippines  1.20  0.65  NA  0.06
Pakistan  0.42  0.79  0.68  0.05  U
Portugal  13.65  8.50  20.48  0.05  I
Colombia  5.85  3.77  8.04  0.04  n
Argentina  9.10  6.81  11.60  0.03  n
Chile  5.03  4.01  6.51  0.03  n
Venezuela  6.13  3.70  8.19  0.02  n
All  9.51  4.64  17.6  0.159
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